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Thispaper is the second report on demand estimates for higher educa-
tion in the United States from our Project on Econometric Models of
Higher Education, supported by the Carnegie Commission on the Fu-
ture of Higher Education.1 In this report I address the problem of
estimating the joint probability distribution of freshman attendance at
alternative types of higher education institutions.
A student's post-secondary-school alternatives are, by and large, a set
of mutually exclusivepossibilities.The choiceof a "best"post-
secondary-school alternative is dependent upon the characteristics of all
the possibilities available to the chooser. Previous studies of the demand
for higher education have found relationships describing the percentage
of total enrollment and the percentage of enrollment at a particular type
of institution. To account for the mutual interdependency between
alternative institutional types, the costs of alternative choice types, these
previous studies have incorporated as individual explainants in single
equation regressions. In our study a more explicit account of the joint
dependency of the post-secondary alternatives is made. The exploration
293of how the distribution of attending alternative post-secondary-school achievemeni
choices is related to individual and institutional characteristics isre- tion with re
ported here. The seco
Stochastic choice theory underlies our demand estimates. A strict "student-inst
model establishes a relationship between utilities and probabilities. A This trend
specific form of the utility function, the exponential of a linear sum of achievement
variables describing the chooser and his or her choices, is assumed. This achievement
function, coupled with the constraints of the choices and the strict had low ad
model, allows for maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the schools, whi
resulting probability distribution function. These estimates are called ginally attra
conditional logit estimates. Variations
The estimated probability functions contain two variables. The first additionalii
variable represents alternative estimates of the ratio of the cost of a expect, dire
particular post-secondary-school choice, to the student's family income, dent's colleg
The second variable is an estimate of the student's SAT (Scholastic predictedpi
Aptitude Test) score multiplied by an estimate of the average freshman children, an
SAT score of the particular post-secondary-school choice, divided by about the re
1,000. We call the first the "cost-to-income" variable, and the second cause some
the "student-institution achievement interaction" variable. Section I
The original data source was a subsample of SCOPE (School to Col- Section II pr
lege: Opportunities for Post Secondary Education). Only a portion of the specification
SCOPE observations had a reliable family-income estimate. The sub- in Section I
sample was divided into two groups; one with a reliable income esti- which is av
mate, referred to as Sample II, and one without a reliable estimate, accompaniec
referred to as Sample I (IIhasmore information than I). Sample II was Section V e,
biased; its students had higher achievement scores and higher student- about the ch
reported family income. As an attempt to understand the biases that with his or
would eventually enter our final results we computed demand estimates
for both samples.
An aggregation of the observations by state yielded poor results. The
"cost-to-income" coefficient was negative and often significant, as antici- SECTIONI:F
pated. But the coefficient on the "student-institution achievement in- OFTHE LITE
teractionvariable" fluctuated considerably. Sample I seemed to yield
better results than Sample II. Because of our sampling design, it was In 1967, the
likely that Sample I was more homogeneous than Sample II. This result higher educa
suggested that more homogeneous groups might yield better demand the first to
estimates. demand des
State observations were pooled and four achievement groups were R (defined a
constructed in each sample. Two significant patterns emerged. The first as resident c
was that the "cost-to-income" coefficients were significantly negative; (defined,
and as achievement rose the value of the coefficient became less nega- household ar
tive. The low-achievement group had a relatively elastic demand for index). Theii
higher education with respect to cost and income, and the high- the proportic






































achievement group to a significantly positive coefficient for the high-
tion with respect to cost and income.
The second pattern to emerge was that the coefficients on the
"student-institution achievement interaction variable" also had a trend.
This trend went from a significantly negative coefficient for the low-
achievement group to a significantly positive coefficient for the high-
achievement group. The middle groups were in between. Students who
had low achievement measures were marginally repelled from better
schools, while students who had high achievement measures were mar-
ginally attracted to better schools.
Variations in the conditional logit estimates were introduced with
additional information about the high school seniors. As one would
expect, direct information such as high school curriculum and the stu-
dent's college plans cause the greatest alterations in the demand model's
predicted probabilities. The educational objectives of parents for their
children, and other measures related to the perceptions students have
about the relationship between education and the future labor market
cause some marginal shifts in the demand probability predictions.
Section I presents a review and critique of the previous studies.
Section II presents the model and a description of the estimated demand
specifications. We include a short description ef the data and sampling
in Section III. A more complete discussion appears in an appendix
which is available from the author. A presentation of the results is
accompanied by a discussion of the research process in Section IV.
Section V extends the model and considers how additional information
about the chooser (student) alters the probability distribution associated
with his or her choices.
SECTIONI: REVIEW AND CRITIQUE
OF THE LITERATURE
In1967, the process of empirical estimates for the demand for
higher education in the United States began. Campbell and Siegel were
the first to generate enough information to make the first empirical
demand description.2 Their published result consists of a regression of
R1 (defined as the proportion of people between age 18 and 24 enrolled
as resident degree undergraduates in 4-year institutions), on YH(,and
(defined, respectively, as an estimate of real disposable income per
household and an index of tuition costs deflated by the consumer price
index). Their linear log specification yielded an elasticity of 1.2036 for
the proportion enrollment with respect to household disposable income,
295 Leonard S. Millerand an elasticity of —.4404for the proportion of enrollment with respect of
to tuition costs. Both elasticities were significantly different from zero at the Metropol the .025 level, and 93 per cent of the variance was explained by the sachusetts, regression. Nine observations between 1927 and 1963 served as the Since each estimation data in the Campbell-Siegel work. were differer
One problem with this first study is that an identification problem school senior
probably exists in their analysis. Consequently, their demand estimates nia (UC). Ho
are probably biased. If equilibrium is assumed in the enrollment mar- on 1965 Call:
ket, annual enrollment equals the annual supply of places. R1, then, is information o
also the probability that an enrollment place in higher education will be University of
supplied to someone between 18 and 24 years old. Like demand, supply represent the could be related to and Due to the likelihood that any campus. A se increase in the public sector's supply of places would be related to demand of t..
taxable per capita income, YH,wouldbe positively related to residence cor
could be positively related tofor the usual reason that more places campuses at
will be offered as price rises, function was
On the other hand, an identification problem might not exist. Many of Irvine (UCI).
the most sought after 4-year institutions (those institutions where appli- the weighted
cants exceed capacity) are not in a simple price equilibrium. Rather Hoenack dete
than expand institutional capacity, suppliers apply greater selectivity to separate cami
applicants. To the extent that the supply schedule reflects this group of not presentec
institutions, the price parameter may be absent. Here, the demand In his stud
schedule is identified. enrolled at sp
It is my feeling that the results themselves suggest some bias. Con- high school, 1
sider the income distribution associated with a unit increase of disposa- tions of the a
ble per capita income in relation to the dependent variable in the the cost to ti
Campbell-Siegel formulation. One portion of the income increase ac- junior college,
crues to families whose children do not presently attend 4-year colleges, income of fam
and the other portion accrues to families whose children are presently graduating se
enrolled in 4-year colleges. None of the portion of the income increase wage rate dat
accruing to the enrollees can logically increase enrollment. Some of the equations md
income may go to increased expenses, but that is not the dependent time was valu
variable. Any 4-year college enrollment increase attributed to an income Alternative
increase can only come from students enrolled in less than 4-year logarithmic, al
colleges, and from nonstudents. We expect, then, that the percentage of not logged. Or
4-year college enrollment with respect to disposable income elasticity brackets and ol
will be less than one. The enrollment elasticity computed by Campbell To give a fl
and Siegel, however, was 1.20. equations as a
I am acqtiainted with two other econometric demand studies which
attempt to determine income and price responses to enrollment. Both log (A uci+ucl.
studies were the result of state-level attempts to impose rational plan- £
ning on a state higher-education system. One study, by Stephen A.
Hoenack, was done for the Office of Analytical Studies, at the University
296 Demand for Higher Education in the U.S. 297 Leonarof California.3 The other study was produced by a team of consultants for
the Metropolitan Area Planning Council for the Commonwealth of Mas-
sachusetts, Board of Higher Education.4
Since each study had different objectives, their equation specifications
were different. Hoenack's task was to determine the California high
school seniors' demand for freshman places in the University of Califor-
nia (UC). Hoenack estimated two sets of demand specifications with data
on 1965 California high school seniors. One set of specifications used
information on Los Angeles area eligibles and their attendance at the
University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA). This set was used to
represent the demand function of all freshmen commuters for any UC
campus. A second set of demand functions represented the enrollment
demand of UC eligibles for UC campuses outside their high school
residence communities. Separate equations were estimated for the UC
campuses at Davis, Berkeley, and Santa Barbara, and an aggregate
function was estimated for attendance at UCLA, Riverside (UCR), and
Irvine (UCI). The aggregate demand for each campus was set equal to
the weighted sum of the commuter plus noncommuter demand.5
Hoenack determined a UC aggregate demand function by summing the
separate campus functions. The actual demand function achieved was
not presented, however..
In his study the dependent variable was the percentage of freshmen
enrolled at specific UC campuses out of the total UC eligibles from each
high school, E. The independent variables were: (1) various combina-
tions of the cost of attending alternative UC campuses, P (campus); (2)
the cost to the high school senior of attending the nearest state and
junior college, Psc and respectively; (3) estimates of the median
income of families in each high school's census area, Y; (4) the number of
graduating seniors from a high school, G; and (5) unemployment and
wage rate data on the high school's region, U and W. The commuter
equations included an estimate of the daily commuting cost. Students'
time was valued at $2.40 per hour.
Alternative demand specifications were tried; they were usually linear
logarithmic, although some of the independent variables were
not logged. Ordinary least squares were performed on combined income
brackets and on various combinations of income quartile disaggregations.
To give a flavor of Hoenack's results I include one of his estimated
equations as an example.
log (A u(R+ucl+UcLA)=19.11+.002G+1.992log PUCB —5.740 log
E (9.21)(1.86) (3.48) (—3.44)









































the University+.98 log Pjc +.69 log 1' tion, which
(1.70) (1.81) income ofproc + .05 log U —2.45log W' as measured
(.20) (—3.07)
—.000126(P UCB+P log employment,
(—3.28) The
+.000346 P UCLA logY ees; Percentag
percentage of
—.00067P sc log Y —.00007P jc log to highest the
(—2.27) (—1.77)
. Theirresults a
R2 =.99; = 2.10;all income brackets; 90 observations; t values in In the equa
parentheses.6 . onlythe coeffi
Hoenack finds a demand elasticity of —.85for the percentage of ent from zero.
enrollment with respect to price for UC campuses. This value varies respect to pri
from —1.12for the lowest income bracket to —.71for the highest. public universi
Hoenack reports that state colleges appear to be a close substitute for Percentage of
UC campuses. If state college prices rise simultaneously with UC price colleges as it is
rises, but with increases only two-thirds of the UC price increase, the The unempL
students' price elasticity for UC diminishes substantially. Average wage rate was
price elasticity values fall from —.85to —.51;the lowest income group's Hoenack.
values decrease from —1.12 to —.68, and the highest income group's The authors
values decrease from —.71to —.48. the father's ed
The decision to commute or to live away from home was apparently reader is provi
significantly affected by the wage rates prevailing in the hometown area. tion was simpl
They were not affected by the unemployment rate.7 COllege-ageP°1
Income elasticities are not reported. However, the elasticity implied elasticity is .28
by the sample equation above is approximately .7. When the
Hoenack made a limited attempt at extending his demand formulation most twice the
to the state and junior colleges in California. No estimates are actually sitiesas femal
is almost presented, but Hoenack claims to have been unsuccessful at explaining sex highlights ti attendance at the state college geographically nearest to each high
school, and successful at explaining the proportion of high school seniors to sex). Both r
are consistent', attending their nearest junior college. The junior collegetuition- education than enrollment result given is that a $100 increase in junior college tuition college for mor would diminish enrollment by approximately 7 per cent.
The Massachusetts—Metropolitan Area Planning Council study on
that
much as men's higher education took as its task the development of a coordinated and
comprehensive public policy for higher education in the state. They saw
the question of attending versus not attending any higher education Computed El
institution as their principal problem. The dependent variable in this withRespect
studywas the percentage of 1960 tenth-grade high school students who
attended college in 1963.
Thefollowing independent variables were used: (1) junior college Males
tuition, Pj; (2) public 4-year university tuition, Pu; (3) tuition at teachers' Females -
college, (4) private 4-year university tuition, P9; (5) father's educa-






























tion, which was supposed to proxy for family income, E; (6) average
income of production workers, a proxy for opportunity cost, Y; (7) ability
as measured by performance on achievement tests, A; and (8) un-
employment, U.
The Massachusetts study presented regressions for percentage enroll-
ees; percentage enrollees by sex; and because of possible nonlinearities,
percentage of enrollees by quartiles of father's education. From lowest
to highest these quartiles are denoted by LSES, 2SES, 3SES, HSES.
Their results are reported in the table on page 300.8
Inthe equation explaining the aggregate enrollment percentage level
only the coefficient on teachers' college tuition is not significantly differ-
ent from zero. The computed percentage enrollment elasticities with
respect to price are: —.09for junior colleges, —.18for 4-year state
public universities, and —.19for 4-year private universities in the state.
Percentage of enrollment appears to be twice as price inelastic for junior
colleges as it is for public universities or for 4-year private institutions.
The unemployment coefficient was significant in this equation and the
wage rate was not. This result is just the opposite of that found by
Hoenack.
The authors of the Massachusetts study caution against a direct use of
the father's education to compute an income elasticity. However, the
reader is provided with almost all the figures to do so, and the tempta-
tion was simply too great. Assuming the mean family income of the
college-age population as ten thousand dollars, the implied income
elasticity is .28.
When the sample was stratified by sex, we find males showing al-
most twice the marginal price responsiveness towards public univer-
sitiesas females.Similarly,the marginal responsiveness to ability
is almost twice as high for men asfor women. Disaggregating by
sex highlights the results of institutional sexism (discrimination according
to sex). Both results, price responsiveness and ability responsiveness,
are consistent with the finding that males have higher rates of return on
education than do females. The price result suggests that men attend
college for more economic reasons than women, while the ability result
suggests that women do not behave as if their abilities will be valued as
much as men's abilities will be valued.
ComputedElasticity of Total Percentage Enrollment
with Respect to Price
Junior CollegePublic UniversityPrivate 4-Year College
Males —.096 —.27 —.23
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zWhen the Massachusetts sample was stratified by father's education, a
proxy for socioeconomic status (SES), most of the variables stop being
significant. For example, only the junior college price is significant for
the lowest SES group, and only the private college price is significant for
the highest SES group. The two middle groups have no significant price
coefficients. Father's education (SES) is significant for the lower three
quartiles, the wage rateis negatively significant for the lowest SES
group, unemployment is never significant, and ability rather uniformly
affects the upper three groups.
Uncertainty about the Campbell-Siegel estimates arises out of the fact
that the model used to describe their problem is incomplete. One aspect
of this incompleteness is the question of whether the supply function
required specification. In addition, if the reader will recall, there was
some difficulty interpreting the per capita income coefficient, given the
4-year-enrollment dependent variable. This latter difficulty arose be-
cause the specification of the problem was incomplete in yet another
way.
Many different types of higher education institutions exist. One would
like to have known how additions to per capita income, or how the
changes in the cost of attending a specific type of institution affected
enrollment in all higher educational types. To some extent the models
offered by Hoenack and the Massachusetts study improved on the
Campbell-Siegel effort. Neither of the former two studies had identifica-
tion problems, for both used cross-sectional data and assumed short-run
fixed supply. And, both attempted to get at the existence of alternative
higher education institution types by incorporating the costs of alterna-
tive institutions as independent explainants. However, none of the
studies reported address themselves to the problem of explaining the
joint dependency of the demand for these different institutional types.
The reported 35 per cent drop in UC's own price elasticity when state
college prices change dramatically illustrates the interdependency of
demand decisions concerning higher education.
Individual choices are made within a framework of jointly dependent
post-secondary-school alternatives. These include the alternative institu-
tional possibilities and the choice of not going on to college. These
possibilities can be described by attributes; items like cost and quality
perhaps among some of the more important of these attributes. This
jointly dependent decision-making framework will be developed in the
sections to follow.
Before proceeding, however, one further note is necessary. In addi-




301 Leonard S. Mi(Iertional choice, and some comment on this matter is called for. Galper
and Dunn studied the short-run nonmarket effect of the rate of growth
of the armed services on the Campbell-Siegel enroll-
ment series.9 Their contribution to the demand estimation problem is an
estimate of the effect the armed forces play on 4-year college enroll-
ment. They estimated the elasticity of enrollment with respect to the
annual rate of growth of the armed services at —.26,and their enroll-
ment elasticity with respect to discharges was .13. One should add that
their income elasticity estimate was .69, a value consistent with our
previous argument, and similar to that found in Hoenack's example.
After estimating the probability distribution of attending alternative
types of schools, principally as a function of economic and achievement
variables, our attention is addressed to more noneconomic aspects of the
higher education choice decision. Specifically, we compute how our
estimates of the probability distribution are altered by additional infor-
mation about the chooser. This analysis appears in the final section.
SECTIONII: THE MODEL
Eachgraduating high school senior faces a supply of higher education
institutions to which he or she is eligible. We shall call this institutional
collection, along with the alternative of not going on to higher educa-
tion, the individual's feasible choice set. Individuals have a multiple-
choice problem. They choose one and only one of these separate alterna-
tives from their feasible choice set. We are dealing, therefore, with a
demand more like that for houses or automobiles than for butter or beer,
in the sense that the choice is among a small number of discrete
alternatives rather than among different quantities of a divisible good.
Estimating the freshman demand for higher education becomes a prob-
lem of specifying and estimating this choice process.
Choosers and their choice sets will be described with personal and
institutional variables, respectively. We will assume that the objective
function will be the same for the entire population; only the variables
describing the people or their alternatives will alter any individual's
selection ofbest." However, our descriptions are rather simplistic.
And, it will often be the case that similarly described people choosing
from similarly described feasible choice sets differ in their assessment of
the best alternative.
The usual theory of choice would infer in this situation that the
chooser or choosers are indifferent among the choices; they perceive the
same subjective benefit from them. This is so even when nine out of









































over the feasiled for. Galper every ten students choose one alternative and the tenth chooses
rate of growth another. An appeal to data insufficiencies might be made, but such
enroll- recourse does not solve the underlying logical problem: similarly de-
.n problem is an scribed students may not choose the same best choice, and we should
college enroll- not infer that students are indifferent between all the chosen alterna-
respect to the tives.
'ad their enroll- The demand functions reported on here are based on a model of
should add that stochastic choice theory. The logical framework of this theory explicitly
istent with our accounts for this indifference problem. The selection of the best post-
example. secondary-school alternatives will be viewed as a stochastic utility-
cling alternative maximization problem. In this section the underlying theory for the
achievement freshman demand functions is presented. In addition, the section in-
Ic aspects of the cludes a brief account of the specifications, the estimation technique,
npute how our and some discussion of the expected signs of the parameters.
infor-
final section. StochasticChoice Theory
LetA be a finite set of discrete post-secondary alternatives, and let J1 be
the feasible choice set for individual i,C A. Imagine that we are
either dealing with one chooser who makes repeated choices, or that we
are dealing with many choosers assumed to behave alike. It is likely that
the utility derived from choicej is greater than the utility derived from
education choice k, when both j and k are in the feasible choice set, and j is
this institutional chosen nine out of ten times over k. Stochastic choice theory asserts this
thigher educa- likelihood, while absolute choice theory establishes indifference be-
ave a multiple- tween the two choices.1° There are many models of stochastic choice
eparate alterna- theory; they differ according to the specificity of the ordering relation
with a and the probabilistic assumptions between the choices. All models begin
butter or beer, by assuming that the basic axioms of probability theory apply to the
ber of discrete elements J of the feasible choice set for individual i,whereC A.
divisible good.
a prob- (1) 0
(2) =1
Ji thpersonal and
at the objective The simplest stochastic theory, a weak stochastic model, asserts that
ly the variables when the utility of j is greater than the utility of k, there is a tendency
any individual's to choosej over k. Formally, there exists a constant real-valued vector U
tther simplistic, over A such that: U(j)U(k) 1FF Prob(j}{j,k}) '/2.Uis called a
eople choosing weak utility function."
ir assessment of The stochastic model actually used to achieve our demand equations
imposed more structure on the choice set and the ordering relation than
that the is imposed by the weak model, A strict utility model was used, which is
perceive the defined as follows: There exists a constant positive real-valued vector U
nine out of over the feasible set J, J C A, such that for any j, k eJ
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(3) U(j)IU(k)=Prob(jIJ)/Prob(k f)
Block and Marschak have shown that a strict model implies, but is not
implied by, a weak model.'2
From equation 2 the probability of individual i choosing institutional
type j is expressed as
(4) Prob(j= Prob(j1 Prob(k
The strict utility model states that utilities are proportionate to prob-
abilities. The probability that individual i chooses choice typej, can
be rewritten as:
(5) 4ijj= Prob(jIfs) =
A specific form for the utility function allows one to relate the
descriptions of the student choosers and their alternative choices to
utility and relative frequency. Estimation of the parameters of the model
are based on a maximum likelihood process.
Let andrepresent the hth variable and hth constant, respec-
tively, in a linear sum
(6) fu
Itis assumed that the utility or subjective benefit to individual i from
institutional type j is given by the explicit equation
(7) U,(j) =Fu=










The likelihood function, L(f3)1) is given by
(9) L(/3") =
1jEt,I)
Themaximum likelihood estimates, b11 of /311, are those values ofb11
that maximize L( 1311), McFadden has produced a computer program to
estimate these parameters and has explored the properties of these
estimates. 13
Theavailability of data, and the results of experiments with different
formulations, led us to concentrate on the following variables whose
precise definitions can be found in the appendix available from the
author:
=
asiA =anachievement score for student i(an estimate of i's SAT score);
=ameasure of family income for student i;
Si =ameasure of the "academic selectivity" or "quality" of alternative
j;and
C0 =theout-of-pocket dollar cost to i of going toj (set equal to zero for the
alternative "no school").
We define ZandZinequation 6 above, in terms of these
ionate to prob-
'typej, can
and, for the convenience of discussion, we have given these variables
the names "cost-to-income" and "student-institutional achievement in-
teraction" respectively.
The greater the "cost-to-income," the less the individual wants the
alternative. Thus, the sign of the estimate b' for /31isunambiguously
anticipated as negative.
For any given individual, the better the quality of the institution the
higher is the value of the "student-institution achievement interaction"
variable. The perceived benefits of a better quality school can occur in
the form of greater intellectual and social amenities, or in the form of a
higher rate of monetary return upon completion. The perceived costs of
a better school can occur in the form of either increased competition, or
an increased probability of failure. If an individual interprets his or her
net subjective benefits from an alternative as positive, we expect the
sign of the coefficient on "student-institution achievement interaction"
to be positive. Alternatively, if the individual interprets the costs as
exceeding the benefits, we expect the sign of the coefficient on the
interaction variable to be negative.
Discussion of the conditional logit estimates focuses on marginal and
elasticity terms. What follows is a derivation of these terms from the
joint probability distribution function of the demand model. Given an
individual's feasible choice setthe probability of individual i choosing
alternativej, is given by equation 8.
= +
Differentiationof equation 8 with respect to an individual's achieve-
ment, A, an institution's quality, S), an institution's cost, C0, or the
student's family income,yields the marginal responses with respect
to these variables.
305 Leonard S.Miller
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Denoting was the elasticity of the probability of individual i
choosing choice j with respect to the variable W, the elasticities for the











Twocross elasticities are of particular interest. One indicates the
percentage change incaused by a 1 per cent change in the cost of
choice k,kj1.The other indicates the percentage change incaused
by a 1 per cent change in the quality of choice k,kJ1.The appropriate







Their elasticities are given by






Hoenack found that the elasticity of the percentage of University of
California enrollees with respect to University of California cost was
lower for low-income groups than for high-income groups. Since the









































306 Demand for Higher Education in the U.S. 307 Leonarcin the denominator, the conditional logit results will always reproduce
Hoenack's finding.
SECTIONIII: DATA AND SAMPLING
Estimatingthe proposed model required data unlike any used in previ-
ous demand studies. To my knowledge, no information about the feasi-
ble choice sets of a population existed. Two data sources contained the
actual post-secondary choice selected by high school seniors,and
seemed to have sufficient information to estimate the model if the
feasible choice sets for observations were constructed. These sources
were Project TALENT, and SCOPE (School to College: Opportunities
for Post Secondary Education).
Analysis of Project TALENT data had shown that ability and family
income were highly correlated, and also correlated with college atten-
dance. Although Project TALENT probably had a better analysis of the
nonreporting biases in their follow-up studies, they would not release
the residency location of their subjects. Knowing the locally available
higher education options was one of the determinants of an individual's
feasible choice set. Since SCOPE was willing to release these data, I
decided to proceed with the SCOPE information.
SCOPE is an ongoing longitudinal study, conducted at the Center for
Research and Development in Higher Education, University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley. I was provided with a subsample, 4,434 observations of
1966 high school seniors in California, Illinois, Massachusetts, and North
Carolina.
In addition to high school residency and the post-secondary-school
alternative chosen, the relevant information on each SCOPE observation
was an achievement measure and the observation's estimate of family
income. Further income information had been obtained with a follow-up
mail questionnaire to parents in 1967. Unfortunately, mailed question-
naires never produce unbiased samples.
Of the families queried, 31.6 per cent responded (1,402 out of the
4,434 in the sample). A comparison of the students' achievement test
scores with their high school answers to the family-income question
showed that the sample of youngsters with parent responders had higher
achievement. They were also from higher-income families (determined
by the students' twelfth-grade self-reporting of family income).
These were significant biases. We could not adequately take the
income-reporting bias into account with a corrective sampling proce-








307 Leonard S. Millerreported income was not strong enough. In addition, other differences
between the parent reporters and nonreporters undoubtedly existed. In
an attempt to understand the biases which would appear in our final
results, we decided to make demand estimates for both the reporter and
the nonreporter populations. An income predictor for the nonreporters
was required for the demand specification.'4 In addition, we decided to
sample from both populations in a way that would reasonably assure
coverage of the full range of student achievement and students' family
income.15
Demand samples were drawn in the following manner:
1.The reporter population in each state was allocated into cells
determined by quartiles of achievement and six income ranges.
The entire achievement-income range was covered by sampling
four observations from each cell wherever possible. This sample
will be referred to as Sample II.
2.The nonreporter population in each state was allocated into cells
determined by quartiles of achievement and six predicted income
ranges. Income was then predicted for the Sample II observations
and the rather uniformly distributed achievement-income sample
was allocated into achievement—predicted-income cells. Sample
II's new cell frequency count determined the number of non-
reporters that were drawn from the nonreporter achievement—
predicted-income distributed population. This sample is referred
to as Sample I (I has less information than II).
SECTIONIV: RESULTS
Introduction
Resultsare presented within a twofold context. First, I want to convey
what I have learned about higher education demand functions to date.
Second, I should like to convey to the reader some of the process Roy
Radner and I have gone through to obtain these results. The inclusion of
a discussion of the research process may aid readers in interpreting the
results, and may also be of value to future investigators.
Our first demand estimates were derived from individuals aggregated
on the basis of the state in which they attended high school. We began
with this aggregation because: (1) we processed the individual observa-
tions on a state basis (and we were anxious to see if this estimation
process would work), and, (2) we believed that the demand functions in
308 Demand for Higher Education in the U.S. 309 Leonard
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the different states might actually be different. The basis for this belief
was a kind of reverse of Say's law. Here, the argument concludes,
"Demand creates its own supply." Since there have been historical
differences between the extent of the public higher-education effort in
the four states, this very well might be evidence for the existence of
different higher-education demand functions in the separate states.
In general, these state aggregation specifications were not satisfactory.
The coefficient on the cost-to-income ratio was almost always negative
and often significant; the coefficient on the "student-institution achieve-
ment interaction variable" was sometimes negative, sometimes positive,
and was significant about as often as it was not. No definite pattern
emerged. The more homogeneous income sample, Sample I, was prob-
ably yielding the best results. We decided to pool state observations and
disaggregateon thebasisof achievement.This produced more
homogeneous groups and allowed us to experiment with the idea that
the achievement interaction might vary according to the achievement
distribution in the student population. The small number of our observa-
tions did not allow us to maintain the state level disaggregation, so we
were never able to test successfully whether demand functions varied
between states. Four averaged SAT groupings were constructed, The
ranges for each group were based on an impression acquired of approxi-
mate homogeneous decision-making groups.
Undertheachievementaggregation,twosignificantpatterns
emerged. The cost-to-income coefficients were significantly negative and
contained a trend over the achievement groups. The enrollment elas-
ticities with respect to cost and income ranged from elastic values for
low-achievement students to inelastic values for the high-achievement
students. The student-institution achievement interaction coefficients
also had a trend over the achievement groups. The marginal effects for
the low-achievement students were negative, the marginal effects for the
high-achievement students were positive, and the marginal effects for
the middle-achievement groups were in between. It appears that the
higher-achieving students are attracted to better schools and the lower-
achieving students are repelled from these schools. Apparently their
history of relative academic failure is such as to marginally shift them
away from a continuation of experiences like those they have already
had.
Alternative Specifications
As I have previously stated, the demand specifications contained two
variables. One variable, which for convenience we named the "cost-to-
income" variable, measured the ratio of institutional cost estimates to
309 LeonardS.Millerstudent family-income estimates.The othervariable,named the
student-institution achievement interaction variable, measured the prod-
uct of the student's achievement, Aandour estimate of the average
SAT score of the freshman class at the choice under consideration, Sj,
divided by 1,000 (to convert the units back into the SAT range).
For Sample II, we had four income estimates: (1) reported income, Y;
(2) predicted income, YH; (3) an estimate of disposable reported income,
DY; and (4) an estimate of disposable predicted income, DYH. For Sam-
ple I, the reported income estimates, (1) and (3), were not available. A
rather complete discussion of these variables, and others introduced
below, appears in the appendix available from the author.
Two cost estimates were available for each group; the out-of-pocket
costs, C, and the C value with an opportunity cost estimated at $3,000
added to each choice, except the choice of not going to a higher-education
institution. This cost was represented by the symbol CO. Combining the
two cost estimates with the four possible income estimates produced eight
possible cost-to-income ratios for Sample II. Combining the two possible
cost estimates with the two possible income estimates produced four
possible cost-to-income ratios for Sample I.
DetailedState Aggregation Results
Table1 contains the results of estimating the demand function parameters
with one variable in the conditional logit estimation function. Each van-
able previously discussed was estimated separately. A brief glance at
Table 1 shows:
1.The CfYcoefficientsalways yield negative significantresults.
California and Illinois estimates are about the same, North Caroli-
na'sestimates are half as large as California's and Illinois's, and
Massachusetts's is two-thirds of North Carolina's.
2.The CIYH coefficients again yield negative significant results (ex-
cept in the case of the Massachusetts Sample II), but (a) the
estimates are about 75 per cent larger than the CIYestimatesfor
the Sample II groups, and (b) the comparisons of Sample I and
Sample II range from fairly similar estimates for California to quite
different estimates for North Carolina. C.)
3.The disposable income and predicted income specifications, C/DY
and CIDYK, do not seem to contribute much understanding. These
estimates are not significant in half of the states.
4.Adding the opportunity cost to the out-of-pocket cost seems to
reproduce the results found in the four specifications already corn-
mented on. There are, of course, differences in the values of the
coefficient estimates.
wJ
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.The student-institution achievement interaction coefficient estimate
appears to be negative and significant in all cases except Mas-
sachusetts Sample II again. Frankly, we had not anticipated this
result.
These five points tentatively suggested that most of our understanding
will be derived from the out-of-pocket cost, the reported income, and
the predicted income variables. The additional work that went into
creating the other variables produced virtually no payoff. Furthermore,
we are rather skeptical of single variable specifications.
Results of estimating the specifications with both variables included
for Sample II and Sample I, by state, are presented in Table 2. The
Sample II results are quite diverse. If one variable is significant in one
specification, the other variable, more often than not, is not significant.
The variable which is significant in any specification also varies between
states. Sample II's estimates had only three specifications in which both
variables were significant, the C/DY specification in California, the CIYH
specification in Illinois, and the CfYspecificationin Massachusetts. In U)
these three cases, the cost-to-income coefficient was always negative,
butthe achievement interaction coefficient was negative in California
and positive in the other two states. To repeat, not much consistency.
The Sample I estimates are less diverse than the Sample II estimates.
In California, all the student-institution coefficients were negative and
significant, and no cost-to-income coefficient was significant. For North
Carolina we have an apparently opposite result: no student-institution
coefficient was significant, while all the cost-to-income coefficients were
negative and significant. The Illinois and Massachusetts results were a .0
researcher'sdream. Both coefficients were significant in every specifica-
tion. Moreover, their estimates appeared to be reasonably consistent
with one another. Both had positive, similar magnitudes on the student-
institution variable, and both had negative, similar magnitudes on the
cost-to-income variable.
All things considered, it was a very unsatisfactory state of affairs. A
comparison of the results of Sample I and Sample II, however, did
suggest how to proceed. E
Our sampling control for Sample II had assured an achievement and
income dispersion. While we could not really know the true income
dispersion of Sample I, it was extremely likely that the Sample I groups
were more homogeneous in economic status, within each ability group, E
than were the Sample II groups.Since the demand specifications
worked less well in the more diversely designed sample (Sample II), we
concluded that it may have been just too simplistic on our part to have
expected rather different people to function asif they had similar
decision-making functions. In Sample I, where we had less diverse
U)
I-










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Demand Estimates by State and by Sample
(California Sample I)
groups, the specifications either worked, as in the cases of Illinois and
Massachusetts, or for some unknown reason, one variable dominated the
explanation, as in the cases of California and North Carolina.
There seemed to be very little discrepancy about the sign of the
cost-to-income variable no matter what group or state was considered.
But the estimate of the achievement interaction variable differed both
within states, by sample, and between states. We thought that we
needed more homogeneous achievement groups. We did not have the
resources to extend our sample, so we aggregated the state observations
and disaggregated the student observations into four achievement
groups. The ranges selected for each achievement group were not totally
arbitrary; they were based on impressions about homogeneous student
decision-making. The lowest-achievement group contained the students





Interaction C/YH C/DYH CO/YH CO/DYH
—.253 .10-1* —1.271
(.594.10-2) (1.24)
























NOTE:See note toTable 2-A.TABLE 2-G Demand Estimates by State and by Sample
(Massachusetts Sample I)
Achievement









with average SAT scores of less than 400.Themiddle-lower group had
SATs average greater than or equal to 400,butless than 475. The
upper-middle group covered the range up to 550,andthe upper group's
average SAT scores were 550 or above.
AchievementAggregation Results
Table3,like Table 1 before, contains the results of estimating the
demand functions separately for each variable in the utility function.
Since we have argued that we are not very interested in these single
variable specifications, we shall not dwell on their detailed results. They
Achievement








(.604- 10_2) (.792. 10')
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NOTE:See note to Table 2-A.
TABLE 2-HDemand Estimates by State and by Sample















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































arepresented because they clearly illustrate two of the most interesting
aspects of higher-education demand functions that we have found to >.
date,namely, that there are trends in the coefficient estimates as one 2
moves from the low-achievement group to the high-achievement group.
These trends exist in almost every cost-to-income specification, and in
the student-institution achievement interaction specification, and in
both samples.
First, for the cost-to-income coefficients, the trends run from rela-
tively high negative coefficient estimates for low-achievement groups to
relatively low negative coefficient estimates for the high-achievement >..
group.The high-achievement group's values are almost always not sig-
nificantly different from zero. Second, the student-institution achieve- Ci)
mentinteraction coefficients trend from statistically significant nega-
tive values for the low-achievement group to statistically significant
positive values for the high-achievement group.
The sign reversal in the student-institution achievement interaction
coefficients, going from negative for low-achievement students to posi-
tive for high-achievement students indicates a complete reversal in the
marginaleffectofquality.Giventhestudents'eligibility,low-
achievement students are repelled from better schools and high-
achievement students are attracted to them.
Table 4 presents the achievement-group aggregation estimations with
both variables. The general results found for the single variable spec- a
ificationsappear again. For Sample II, the Cftspecificationhas both
coefficients significant in the lowest and the highest SAT groups. The
cost-to-income coefficients are more negative for the low-achievement
groupthan for the high-achievement group. The achievement variable w 0
offersa negative influence on the lower group and a positive influence
on the higher group. The two middle achievement groups have their
cost-to-income variable coefficients negative and significant, and their
magnitude places them in the trend from elastic demand for lower-
achieving students to inelastic demand for higher-achieving students
with respect to cost and income. The trend in the student-institution
achievementcoefficientplacesthemiddleachievementgroup .2i
coefficientsclose to zero in magnitude. Their estimates did indeed turn
out not significantly different from zero.
InSample II, none of the derived cost-to-income variables offers as W
consistentresults as the specification that used the reported income di-
rectly. The results of Sample II's predicted income specifications present
the same pattern as was found in the reported income results. Their a,
estimates are not as consistent, however, As with the reported specifica-
tion, two of the four C/YH specifications are significant on both variables.
As achievement rises, there is a downward trend in the CIYH coefficient, w
-J
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]and an upward trend on the coefficient. But, the lower group
did not have its CIYH coefficient significant, and the lower-middle group
22 has its achievement interaction coefficient positively significant. Appar-
ently the achievement variable becomes positive faster than it does in the
reported income specification, so it is never statistically different from
zero.
Comparing the reported and predicted income coefficients for the
upper achievement group shows similar magnitudes on the student-
institution achievement estimates, and a response to predicted income
two and one-quarter times the response to reported income.
The pattern of the Sample I achievement groups estimates was some-
what the same as the pattern of the Sample II achievement groups
estimates. There were some minor variations, however, as the lowest
achievement group had both coefficients significant in the Sample II CI?
specification.The lower-middle group had its achievement coefficient
significant instead of its CIYH coefficient. The trend in the student-
institution achievement variable was somewhat augmented by the fact
that the lower-middle group's estimate was too low. This is undoubtedly
due to the fact that the C/YH coefficient was not significant. An impor-
tant variation is that the trend in the cost-to-income coefficient over the
achievement groups was absent.
The reason the coefficient values for Sample I's cost-to-income spec-
ifications are all approximately equal to the CIYH coefficient in Sample
II's lower-middle achievement group is a mystery. Is it possiblyrelated
the sampling design of Sample I? Or isit related to some attribute
about the reporting versus the nonreporting families?
Elasticities
Itis our opinion that the C/Y and the CIYH specifications of the cost-to-
income variable, in conjunction with the student-institution achieve-
2 2 99 ment interaction variable, are the best demand specifications we found.
Our guess is that, of the two, the reported income is probably better
than the predicted specification, but we shall have to do more work to
determine which specifications are actually better in each achievement
group.
Table 5 contains means and standard deviations of the income and
achievement measures by achievement group, and by sample. Also
included are the samples' achievement-income correlation coefficients.
There is, in general, a decline in the mean income estimates as the
achievement level declines. But the hypothesis that the mean samples
significantly differ in mean income is flatly rejected.
Cz








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IThe correlation coefficients indicate the efficacy of the sampling de-
sign (see Section III).In all groups except Sample I's high ability
group, a rather high degree of independence between the income and
achievement measures was obtained. The income heterogeneity in each
achievement group coupled with the four achievement samples implies
that the estimates do cover the student income-achievement plane.
The following list establishes a correspondence between the post-
secondary-school type number and its description. The list will aid the
reader in interpreting Tables 6, 7, and 8 which follow.
Description Type Number
No higher education 1
Low cost—low achievement 2
Low cost—medium achievement 3
Low cost—high achievement 4
Medium cost—low achievement 5
Medium cost—medium achievement 6
Medium cost—high achievement 7
High cost—low achievement 8
High cost—medium achievement 9
High cost—high achievement 10
Table 6 presents the relative frequencies of the chosen institution
types with the demand model's predicted relative frequencies for the
reported and predicted income specifications in each sample and
achievement group.
The choosers' relative frequencies correspond rather well to the mod-
el's predicted frequencies, but the level of disaggregation by institution
type is probably taxing the limits of the model's ability. Table 10 in
Section V compares eight institutional types, and aggregates the ability
groups. The deviations between observed and predicted relative fre-
quencies in that table are, of course, much less. Approximate average
cost and average institutional quality values for the samples' feasible
choice sets appear in Table 7. The information contained in Tables 4, 5,
6, and 7,theconditional logit estimates, the sample means, the pre-
dicted relative frequencies, and the average cost and quality, respec-
tively, enable computation of the probability of enrolling elasticities with
respect to achievement, quality, cost and income. Tables 8 and 9 display
the income and cost elasticities, respectively, for twelve possible student
types: three by family income, $6,000, $12,000, and $18,000, and four
by student achievement score, 375, 475, 575, and 650. Those elasticities





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































LTABLE 7 Average Costs and Quality I











SECTION V: QUALITATIVE INFORMATION
HereI report on the introduction of qualitative information into the
demand model. Our intention was to develop variations in the demand
model that would incorporate social, psychological, and economic indi-
ces about the student choosers. It appears, though, that the questions
appearing in the SCOPE high school questionnaire had not been based
on well defined indices. And, in order to incorporate qualitative infor-
mation we had to construct our own indices. Rather than abandon the
qualitative project, we proceeded by constructing a few indices of our
own. We gingerly refer to this work as our exercise in amateur sociol-
ogy.
Three models are compared. The first is the conditional logit model,
the second is the conditional logit model with a correction to account for
the possibility that all the probabilities for a particular choice may be off
by a constant. The third model incorporates the qualitative information
about the choosers into the second model. Statistical estimation proce-
dures for the choice-type correction and the qualitative-information cor-




1.The first model is the conditional logit model. For each student i,
=(X11 has a multinomial distribution with
Prob{XQ = Ofork
and =1,and 0 for all i.
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I2.The second model will be called the constant augmented demand
model. Simply described, the augmented logit model has a con-
stant for each choice type j, added to the conditional logit
model:has a multinomial distribution with
=1,Xjk= 0fork = ÷
and =1,and 0 for all i, and =0.
.1
3.The third model is the qualitative information demand model. In
the third model indices are considered one at a time. Each index
is separated into a set of disjoint answer categories, r 1 R.
Each individual has an index value that allocates him or her to
answer category r. Associated with category r is a constant, af.
This constant is added to the augmented conditional logit model.
Thus,has a multinomial distribution with
=1,XIk =0fork = + +af
and =1,and for alli, and 0.
.1
Weassume the students make their decisions independently of
one another, so {Xare distributed independently. We turn
now to the estimation of these models.
Letdenote the observed relative frequency of choicej for a student
population, and pdenote the observed relative frequency of choice j
forthe students who have a category answer r. n' denotes the number
of students in category r.
The observed relative frequencies are determined from the multino-





Inthe constant augmented model the relative frequency for each
choice type-answer response category has an expected value given by
(2)
The observed relative frequency for each category response has an
expected value given by
(3) = + = + = +k,
LeonardS. MillerT
Inthe qualitative information demand model, the expected values of weights which
these two relative frequencies are When an index
1 separatedat th
(2') E(p5)= +k+ =41i + ki+ example, for in
conservative. ana
0
(3') = ++ — +kj+a5 Index Cate
Theexpected value of the difference between the observed relative 2 3
frequencyof the choice type-answer responses and the observed relative 3 5
frequencyof the choice type responses, in both the second and third 4 7
model is given by
i' r r 6 ii
i.4j = — 4,j (for
7 13
The value of the variance of this difference 8 15
9 17




This value can be estimated from the expression
(6) = + k3)(1— — 18
To obtain estimates forin the second model, and thevalues of 20 51-
the third model, we shall substitute the observed relative frequencies 21 53-
for the expected value of choosingj.
Thus,is estimated from equation 3 by After the md
"7" k — thechoice typ
p — gatedtwo of ti
andis estimated from equations 2 and 4 by will help the r
(8) af =3pJ—4,'.j —= (pJ—pj)—(4i'.j —
Choice Type





which can be estimated with equations 5 and 6.
In the following list, the 21 indices, their associated response catego-
8 ries, and a meaningful title appears. The actual questions and score









weights which constitute each index appear in the author's appendix.
When an index has two response categories, the observations have been
separated at the mean index value into low and high responses. For
example, for index
conservative.
1, category 1 is low conservative, category 2 is high
Index Categories Interpretation
1 1—2 Conservative
2 3—4 Subindex of conservatism
3 5—6 Fate control
4 7—8 Self-motivation for problem solving
5 9—10 Broad academic interests
6 11—12 Parents' concern with education
7 Student response to parents' concern
8 15—16 Student academic desires
9 17—18 Index 7 +Index8
10 19—20 Peer group response at the cost of studying
11 21—23 Actual high school program
12 24—26 Will you ever go to college?
13 27—34 Most satisfaction in life
14 35—40 When was post-secondary-school choice made?
15 41—42 Educational implications of preferred jobs
16 43—44 Educational implications of jobs to which the
student is uncertain or indifferent
17 45—46 Student attachment to parents
18 47—48 Desire to sacrifice for future payoffs
19 49—50 Parents' higher education desires for student
20 51—52 Index 6 +(Index 19)
21 53—54 Sex of student
After the indices had been separated into response categories, a few oi
the choice types consistently had only a few observations. We aggre-
gated two of the choice types with two other types. The following list
will help the reader to understand the tables to follow:
Choice Type Meaning
1 No school
2 Low cost—low achievement
3 Low cost—medium achievement
4 Low and medium cost—high achievement
5 Medium cost—low achievement
6 Medium cost—medium achievement
7 High cost—low and medium achievement
8 High cost—high achievement
335 Leonard S. MillerThe constants, appearin the various parts of Table 10 which present
choice type frequency statistics for the following samples: Sample II with
the reported income conditional logit estimates, Sample II with the
predicted income conditional logit estimates, and Sample I with pre-
dicted income conditional logit estimates, respectively. The choice type
TABLE 10Differences between Observed and Predicted







Sample II:Reported Income Model
1 131 127,2003 0.3493 0.3392 0.0101
2 80 66.4680 0.2133 0.1772 0.0361
3 20 19.0140 0.0533 0.0507 0.0026
4 17 20.2639 0.0453 0.0540 —0.0087
5 48 51.7918 0.1280 0.1381 —0.0101
6 37 35.3294 0.0987 0.0942 0.0045









Sample II:Predicted Income Model
1 131 125. 1724 0.3493 0.3338 0.0155
2 80 67.9257 0.2133 0.1811 0.0322
3 20 25.8627 0.0533 0.0690 —0.0156
4 17 24.5696 0.0453 0.0655 —0.0202
5 48 52.3310 0.1280 0.1395 —0.0115
6 37 34.3342 0.0987 0.0916 0.0071









Sample I:Predicted Income Model
1 208 176.4025 0.5637 0.4781 0.0856
2 53 65.1246 0.1436 0.1765 —0.0329
3 8 20.5756 0.0217 0.0558 —0.0341
4 21 22.3369 0.0569 0.0605 —0.0036
5 20 37.9099 0.0542 0. 1027 —0.0485
6 28 23.0234 0.0759 0.0624 0.0135
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336 Demand for Higher Education in the U.S. 337 LeonardThe most extensive change in the predicted probability distribution
occurs when direct information about the higher-education choice deci-
sion is asked for: the present desires of the students (Index 8), their
present high school curriculum (Index 11), or a direct statement of the
possibility of going to college (Index 12). This is not surprising. It is
probably best to view these indices as tests of whether the qualitative
demand corrections work. Still, it is interesting to note that high school
curriculum can readily be incorporated into demand
projections.
Parents' objectives are important (Index 19). If the parent had low
educational objectives, the students were allocated away from higher
education. The conditional logit estimate for no higher education goes
up and the estimates for the local junior college, the medium cost—
medium achievement institutions, and high cost—high achievement
schools go down. Parents with high educational objectives for their
children produced exactly the opposite effect. Parents' concern about
the student's education (Index 6) did not seem to alter the conditional
logit model. Since Index 6 was not effective, the sum of Index 6 and
one-half of Index 17 was also not effective (Index 20).
Economists tend to measure the response to education as a response
to some future labor market. A few of the indices are related to this
relationship. One factor in this education—labor market relationship is
the educational implications of the jobs students prefer. For students
preferring jobs with high educational requirements, significantly more of
them went to higher quality—higher cost colleges, and significantly fewer
of them did not go to college. Students preferring jobs with low educa-
tional requirements behave in exactly the opposite manner (Index 15).
If the student demonstrates high indifference and uncertainty toward
jobs with high educational implications, he or she shows significantly
greater nonattendance at any college, and significantly lower local junior
college attendance. The allocation is reversed for students with high
indifference and uncertainty toward jobs with low educational implica-
tions (Index 16).
Another aspect of the education—labor market relationship has to do
with when the student makes a career choice. The earlier the choice is
made, the more positively altered were the higher cost and higher
quality alternatives. •Students who decide (or accept a decision) on a
337 Leonard S.Miller
constants are determined by equation 7 as the difference between the
observed relative frequency and the average demand predicted relative
frequency. They appear in the final column of Table 10. Due to space
limitations only the choice type—category response estimates, aforthe
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careerbefore the seventh grade, attend highest-quality—highest-cost
institutions in significantly greater numbers, and significantly fewer of
them choose not to achieve higher education.If the student has
made a career decision by the tenth grade, he or she chooses the no
higher education alternative significantly less, but is not allocated to any
particular institutional type. Students who have not yet made a career
choice decide not to go on to higher education with significantly greater
frequency, and they attend medium cost—medium quality schools with
significantlyless frequency (Index 14).
What may be the most interesting result of this section is that indices LI.
which we thought would have been significant were not. Fate control
(Index 3), self-motivation at problem solving (Index 4), broad academic
interest (Index 5), and time preference or sacrificing ability (Index 18)
were examples of indices which did not alter the conditional logit esti-
mates. Are these measures so poor as to have no marginal effect on
choice type, or does the achievement variable already incorporate the
information contained in the indices? .0
The Massachusetts study found that disaggregating their total sample
CO
bystudents' sex altered their results. We did not find this result; only
the medium cost—low quality institutions seemed to be affected. Males
went less frequently and females more frequently. This result was of
some surprise to us too.
These results appear in Table 11. Each choice-type—answer response
category contains a column of three entries. The upper entry is the
equation 8 estimated choice-type—consumer-answer category constant, c
aThemiddle entry is the ratio of the estimated constant to its variance
(as determined by equations 5 and 6). This number is a t-squared, or
chi-squared statistic with one degree of freedom. Constants significantly
different from zero at the .05 level are denoted by an asterisk; con-
stantsdifferent from zeroatthe.01level are denoted by two
asterisks. The lower entry in the choice-type—answer category classifica- 0





1.This project was carried out by Roy Radner at the University of California, Berkeley,
and by the author when he was at Berkeley, and then at SUNY, Stony Brook. The
work presented here is the result of a joint effort.I accept responsibility for any
errors or omissions.I should like to acknowledge that discussions with Daniel
McFadden, in the early phase of this study, were extremely important.
For our first report see B. Radner, and L. S. Miller, 'Demand and Supply in U.S. W
Proceedings60 (May 1970): 326—334. For further developments see Roy Radner and
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The private demand for higher education is an important topic which has the effects of tI
received insufficient attention from economists. Public policy towards higher family income.
education could almost certainly be improvedif the enrollment effects of a
' costs and incor
number of controllable variables were taken into account. For example, envisioning the
analysis of the effects of tuition charges on enrollments can form the basis of an equation in
a policy of using flexibly administered higher-education prices. Such a not interacted
policy could be used to allocate enrollments among educational programs variable is inde
in a manner which would ensure that student subsidies are no higher or good a priori g
lower than necessary to achieve desired enrollments, not independer
Another example is in decision making regarding where to locate cam- assuming an in
puses. Estimates of the effects of travel costs on enrollments could be most come on colleg
helpful for this purpose. priori grounds
Other policy-controllable variables which have enrollment effects include equations expre
the nature of the high school curriculum and the timing and amount of career determines the
counseling provided.
. college attenda
In analyzing some of the complexities of student behavior, Miller's model the estimation
of demand for higher education does a better job than previous models. The family income a
decision of whether to go to college is complicated because it involves a variable.In ath
choice among the different types of schools for which the student is qualified ratio form, such
346 Demand for Higher Education in the U.S. 347 Commi1 logit estimation."
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as well as the choice of whether to go. The importance of this fact can be
seen in the following question: Do students first choose to go to college and
then decide which college to attend, or do the particular college options
available to them affect their decision to go to college? In order to address
such a question, econometric analysis of demand must direct itself to the
determination of joint probabilities of various types of college attendance
and to the hypothesis that college attendance involves sequential decision
making. To my knowledge, Miller's model is the first one which explicitly
takes into account the determination of joint probabilities of college atten-
dance. This is an important advance over previous work.
Another important aspect of Miller's research is its incorporation of social
and psychological determinants of the demand for college attendance, in-
cluding factors related to the high school curriculum and environment. It is
important to estimate the effects of these variables for two reasons. First,
they more fully (and accurately) specify demand relationships and, thus,
improve the estimates of the effects of costs on attendance. Second, vari-
ables such as high school curriculum and career counseling may, them-
selves, be desirable subjects of policy control.
In his research, Miller was confronted with some difficult problems with
measures of students' families' incomes. Miller did what I suspect is the only
existingempiricalanalysisofthedifferences between student- and
parental-reported family incomes. He also developed an income predictor
for students whose parents did not respond to a questionnaire requesting
income data. Most important, Miller estimated his equations with different
income data so that the reader can see the effect of alternative estimates on
the results.
With regard to the specification of the effects of educational costs and
family income on college attendance, Miller's estimating equations express
the effects of these two variables through the ratio of educational costs to
family income. This ratio is a special case of possible relationships between
costs and income on college attendance choices. The most familiar way of
envisioning the influences of costs and income on college attendance is in
an equation in which each of these variables is entered individually and is
not interacted with the other. Note that in this case the effect of either
variable is independent of the level of the other variable. However, these are
good a priori grounds for believing that the effects of costs and income are
not independent of each other. While there are good a priori reasons for
assuming an interactive relationship between the effects of costs and in-
come on college attendance choices, there are not, to my knowledge, a
priori grounds for specifying any particular form of this relationship. Miller's
equations express a particular relationship in which one coefficient entirely
determines the influences of both income and costs on the demand for
college attendance. It would be worthwhile to test this hypothesis through
the estimation of attendance equations in which educational costs and
family income are entered separately, as well as interacted through the ratio
variable.In addition, specifications of interaction terms alternative to the
ratio form, such as multiplicative relationships, could be attempted. For such
Comments by HoenackT
purposes it would be important to have wider ranges of sample cost data for
each type of institution.
Much the same type of comment could apply to the student-institution
achievement interaction variable. Incidentally, it would be interesting to test
the hypothesis that the effect of the institutional component of this variable
would differ according to the type of institution.
In summary, Ibelieve that empirical analysis of the private demand for
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